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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

LEMUEL T. SMALL,

Case No. 900382-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This court has appellate jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 2a,
Section 3(2) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of right from a final judgment of conviction for the
offenses of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
Second Degree Felony; Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, a Third Degree Felony; and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
Third Degree Felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Did the roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was riding
which resulted in the discovery of controlled substances and firearms, violate his

1

right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as
described in Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah?
Did the same roadblock stop violate appellant's right to be free from
warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?
Was there sufficient attenuation between the illegal roadblock stop and the
consent to search the vehicle to relieve the seized evidence of the taint from the
initial stop?
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches ana seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects aeainst unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not oe violated and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated, §41-l-17(a) through (d) (1953 as amended):
The [State Tax] commission, and such officers and
inspectors of the department as it shall designate, peace
officers, state patrolmen, and others duly authorized by
the department, or by law shall have power and it
shall be their duty:
(a) To enforce the provisions of this act and of
all the laws regulating the registration or operation of
vehicles or the use of the highways.
2

(b) To make arrests upon view and without
warrant to any violation committed in their presence of
any of the provision of this act or other law regulating
the operation of vehicles or the use of the highways.
(c) when on duty, upon reasonable belief that
any vehicle is being operated in violation of any
provision of this act or of any other law regulating the
operation of vehicles to require the driver thereof to
stop, exhibit his driver's license and submit to an
inspection of such vehicle, the registration plates and
registration card thereon.
(d) To inspect any vehicle of a type required to
be registered hereunder in any public garage or repair
shop or in any place where sucn vehicles are held for
sale or wrecking, for the purpose of locating stolen
vehicles and investigating the title and registration
thereof.
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15 (1953 as amended):
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was originally charged in a twelve count information alleging
the commission of six felonies and six misdemeanors. (R. 3).

Ultimately,

appellant was tried on a three count amended information alleging two counts
of

Possession

of

a

Controlled

Substance

with

Intent

to

Distribute

(methamphetamine and marijuana) and one count of Possession of a Controlled
Substance (cocaine). (R. 150-151). Prior to trial, appellant and his co-defendant
made a motion to suppress evidence. (R. 26-29).

It was alleged that the

evidence was seized in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of
Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
3

Constitution.

(R. 88-131).

That motion was denied after a hearing at which

evidence was submitted on the preliminary hearing transcript. (R. 87). Evidence
was also taken by the court to supplement that transcript.
written order, the motion to suppress was denied.

(Tr.MS. 1-33).1 In a

(R. 68-71).

Appellant was

tried and convicted by a jury. (R. 195).
On September 29, 1988, law enforcement officers established a roadblock
on the south Fillmore interchange of Interstate 15 in Millard County, Utah.
87 p. 6).

(R.

The roadblock involved the combined efforts of the Utah Highway

Patrol, the Sevier County Sheriffs Office and the Millard County Sheriffs Office.
(R. 87 p.6).

The roadblock was conducted under the direction of Millard

County Sheriff, Ed Phillips.

(Tr.M.S. p. 9). There was no written plan for the

roadblock. The stated purpose for the roadblock was to conduct driver's license,
registration and safety inspections of vehicles. (R. 87 p. 6) (Tr.M.S. p. 6)2.
The officers manning the roadblock received verbal instructions from
Sheriff Phillips, Sergeant Paul Mangleson of the Utah Highway Patrol and Phil
Barney of the Sevier County Sheriffs office. (R. 87 pp. 33, 46-48)..

Sheriff

Phillips instructed the officers to ask all people who were stopped to produce a
driver's license and vehicle registration.

(R. 87 p. 47).

Sergeant Mangleson

instructed the officers to look for objects in the vehicles that had been stopped

a

The transcript of the motion to suppress held on August 4, 1989, shall be
designated "Tr. M.S.".
2

Due to the heavy flow of traffic, the officers manning the roadblock found
it to be impossible to conduct safety inspections of the vehicles stopped at the
roadblock. (Tr.M.S. p. 15).
4

that should arouse suspicion.

(R. 87 p. 46). Phil Barney instructed the officers

to look for suspicious clues in the body language of people stopped at the
roadblock.

(R. 87 p. 47).

It was conceded that one of the purposes of the

roadblock was to stop vehicles and look for such suspicious objects or
circumstances.

(Tr.M.S. p. 19).

Millard County newspaper.

The roadblock was advertised in the local

(R. 87 p. 41). To warn travelers, signs were placed

on the freeway. (R. 87 p. 7). The record does not reflect where those signs were
located in relation to the roadblock.

Nor does the record indicate what was

written on the signs.
At about 11:30 a.m. on September 19, 1988, officers at that roadblock
stopped a vehicle driven by the co-defendant, Dennis Shoulderblade.

(R. 87 p.

7).

(R. 87 p.

8).

Appellant was seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle.

Deputy Millard County Sheriff, Jeff Whatcott, requested the vehicle

registration and license of the driver of the vehicle. (R. 87 p. 9). Shoulderblade
produced a driver's license and appellant produced the registration. (R. 87 p. 89).

The vehicle was registered to Russell Clarence.

indicated that the vehicle belonged to a friend.
requested to produce identification.

(R. 87 p. 9).

(R. 87 p. 9).

Appellant

Appellant was

(R. 87 p. 9). As he pulled out his wallet,

Deputy Whatcott observed appellant shove a clear ziplock plastic bag between
the seats.

(R. 87 p. 9-10.

The deputy then questioned the two about where

they had been (R. 87 p. 10), and if they possessed any alcohol, firearms or
controlled substances.

(R. 87 p. 11-12). Appellant and Shoulderblade indicated

5

that they had been to Las Vegas (R. 87 p. 10) and were not in possession of any
of the contraband listed by the deputy. (R. 87 p. 11-12).
Deputy Whatcott then requested to search the vehicle. (R. 87 p. 12). The
occupants acquiesced to that request.

(R. 87 p. 12).

Shoulderblade exited the

vehicle and a loaded firearm was located under the driver's seat. (R. 87 p. 12).
Whatcott then asked appellant if there were other firearms located in the
vehicle.

(r. 87 p.

13-14).

Appellant

produced

two

loaded

revolvers.

Shoulderblade and appellant were placed under arrest. (R. 87 p. 24). A further
search of the vehicle resulted in the discovery of another firearm (R. 87 p. 28),
eight ounces of methamphetamine, (R. 87 p. 22), six pounds fourteen ounces of
marijuana, (R. 87 p. 25-26), a small quantity of cocaine (R. 87 P. 26-27) and three
thousand seven hundred fifty dollars in currency. (R. 87 p. 23).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The roadblock stop in Millard County violated appellant's right to be free
from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in Article
I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. The officers had no statutory authority
to make such a stop.

Prior to the stop, the officers lacked any individualized

suspicion that any criminal offense had been committed.

The State showed

neither that the roadblock significantly advanced the public interest in law
enforcement nor that there were less intrusive means available to advance that
interest.

Consequently, the evidence seized as a result of this constitutional

violation should have been suppressed.

6

The stop at the Millard County roadblock violated appellant's right to be
free from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The roadblock in question
was not carried out pursuant to a plan designed by neutral and politically
accountable authorities. Furthermore, there was not a grave public concern that
was advanced by the roadblock.

There was no evidence to indicate how the

seizures of vehicles of the roadblock advanced any public interest.

Finally, the

roadblock created a severe interference with the individual liberties of those who
were stopped.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of the constitutionality of a roadblock stop is a matter of law.
Matters of law may be reviewed without deferance to the trial court.

State v.

Sims, 808 P.2d 144 (Utah App. 1991). Conclusions of law have been reviewed
under a "correction of error" standard.
App. 1991).

State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127 (Utah

Both of these standards are the same.

Questions of law are

reviewed de novo by appellant courts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF
UTAH
PRECLUDES
THE
USE
OF
ROADBLOCKS. ANY EVIDENCE SEIZED AT SUCH
A STOP MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
Both the court and the Utah Supreme Court have expressed concern with
the Fourth Amendment rulings of the federal courts in vehicle search cases. As
an alternative, both courts have encouraged counsel to litigate these issues under

7

Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

State v. Earl 716 P.2d 803

(Utah 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987) (Billings, J.
dissenting).3
encouraged

In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), Justice O'Connor
state

courts

to

decide

search

and

seizure

issues

on

state

constitutional grounds rather than resorting to a Fourth Amendment analysis.
Furthermore, it is also beyond question that a State Constitution may provide
greater protections to individuals than does the Federal Constitution.4
In State v. Earl supra, the court suggested that the analysis described in
State v. Tewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985), be applied to an interpretation of Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Roadblocks have been held to be

unreasonable seizures of the person on state constitutional grounds. 5 There are
three basic reasons given for this result:

First, law enforcement agents lack

statutory authority to conduct a roadblock6; second, an individual cannot be
detained without a showing that the officer has an individualized suspicion that
a crime has been committed; and third, a balancing of the interests involved in
a roadblock stop indicate that such stops are unreasonable seizures of the
person.

3

For an extensive discussion of the background of this particular issue see:
Davis and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety
Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 B.Y.U.J. of Pub. Law 357 (1989).
4

See footnote 3.

'Those cases will be discussed, infra.
6

See: State v. Sims, supra, and Point LA. infra.
8

A.
THE
ROADBLOCK
IN
THIS
CASE
WAS
CONDUCTED WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAW
In State v. Sims, supra, this court held that a roadblock conducted without
a specific legislative authorization violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

The court found that the state supreme court in State v. Larocco,

794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), announced a policy requiring a neutral authority to
authorize police to make seizures on less than probable cause. The court noted
that in situations that do not involve exigent circumstances, the judicial branch
of the government generally acts as the neutral authority.
In

other

circumstances

it was

recognized

that

the

legislature

has

authorized stops based on less than probable cause.7 The court reasoned that in
such circumstances the legislature weighs the need for suspicionless stops
against the degree of intrusion.

Since the legislature essentially involves the

citizens of the state acting through elected representatives, such decisions involve
a high degree of political accountability.

In Sims, the court found that the

authorization for the roadblock came solely from law enforcement agents.

That

resulted in the court concluding,
Consistent with our supreme court's emphasis on
the warrant requirement, then, we hold that
suspicionless, investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks,
conducted without legislative authorization, are per se
unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
808 P.2d at 149.

7

The court cited brief warrantless stops made pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§41-1-17(c) (1953 as amended) and fish and game roadblocks made pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §23-20-19 (1953 as amended), as examples of such
authorization.
9

Several other state courts have reached the same conclusion regarding the
need for express statutory authority for law enforcement officers to conduct a
roadblock. The Supreme Court of Oregon addressed this issue in the context of
a civil suit for damages by a plaintiff who was stopped at a roadblock.

Nelson

v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (Or. 1987). Two other criminal cases
involving similar roadblocks were addressed by that court at that time: State v.
Bovanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987), and State v. Anderson, 304
Or. 139, 743 P.2d 715 (Or. 1987).

In Nelson v. Lane County, supra, the state

sought to uphold the use of a roadblock on the basis that such a seizure was
constitutionally authorized.
In Nelson, the state maintained that it had statutory authority to conduct
a roadblock under a general statute that gave law enforcement agencies the
authority to enforce the criminal law.
implicitly authorized

The state claimed that the statute

roadblocks and that the roadblock in question

conducted in accordance with "The Oregon State Police Patrol Manual."
rejecting this argument, the court reasoned,
By and large, agencies of the executive branch
are free to carry out their assigned responsibilities in
ways of their own choosing.
Making explicit the
manner in which any aeency is to accomplish its task
falls to the agency heaa or that official's designee to
instruct or sub-delegate to subordinated officials.
However, some procedures may invade the
personal
freedoms
protected
from
government
interference by the constitution.
Roadblocks are
seizures of the person, possibly to be followed by a
search of the person or the person's effects. For this
reason, the authority to conduct roadblocks cannot be
implied. Before they search or seize, executive agencies
must have explicit authority from outside the executive
branch.
743 P.2d at 695.

10

was
In

Similarly, in State v. Henderson, 114 Ida. 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (Ida. 1988),
the Supreme Court of Idaho held that its constitutional provision prohibiting
warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures required express legislative
authority to conduct a roadblock.

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

found roadblocks to be unreasonable under similar provisions of the Oklahoma
Constitution.

One of the justifications for the court's decision was that officers

lacked statutory authority to make such stops. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562
(Okla. 1984).
In this case, the only authorization for the roadblock came from law
enforcement.

The procedures and conduct of this and the Sims roadblock were

virtually identical.

The two were conducted approximately sixty days apart.

The Sims roadblock was located in adjoining Juab County and it was on the
same interstate highway as the roadblock in this case.

This court's ruling in

Sims should govern the roadblock in this case. This court should hold that the
roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
B.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF
UTAH
REQUIRES
INDIVIDUALIZED
SUSPICION
TO
JUSTIFY
A
SEIZURE
OF
APPELLANTS PERSON
In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super. 1985), the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania discussed the propriety of roadblock stops under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.

The Pennsylvania legislature had previously enacted

a statute allowing law enforcement agencies to utilize roadblock stops for the

11

purpose of checking vehicles, drivers or documents.

The defendant in Tarbert

had been convicted of driving under the influence as a result of a roadblock
stop. The court reviewed the case law on roadblocks and noted:
Courts upholding the constitutionality of roadblocks are
not unmindful of their intrusiveness, but rather, stress
that careful control and absence of discretion can bring
the use of the roadblock within the Fourth Amendment.
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, supra, at 225.

With respect to this reasoning, the

court held:
While the arguments supporting the constitutionality of
systematic roadblocks are persuasive, the rationale
supporting them is flawed. JMO amount of control or
limited discretion can justify the "seizure" that takes
place in the complete absence of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that a motor venicle violation has
occurred.
Certainly, the Constitution of our
Commonwealth affords its citizens the right to be free
from intrusions where one has a reasonable expectation
or privacy.
Ibid at 225-226. The court ultimately held that the Pennsylvania Constitution is
violated when roadblock stops are not based on probable cause or on a
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.
The holding in State v. Henderson, supra, has previously been discussed
with respect to the effect of the lack of statutory authority to conduct a
roadblock.

The Idaho Supreme Court went further in Henderson and held that

under the Idaho Constitution, law enforcement officers are required to have
individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before a stop of a vehicle may
be made.

The Supreme Court of Oregon reached the same conclusion in State

v. Boyanovsky, supra.

Boyanovsky was the companion case to Nelson v. Lane

12

County, supra.

It addressed a roadblock search resulting in a criminal

conviction rather than a civil action against law enforcement authorities.

The

Supreme Court of Louisiana also concluded that there was a need for
individualized suspicion to invade one's privacy under its state constitution.
Consequently, a roadblock stop was held to be unconstitutional in Louisiana.
State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293 (La. 1988).
By statute, officers in Utah are required to have individualized suspicion
of criminal activity before violating a citizen's privacy interest.8 Both the Utah
Supreme Court and this court have required such individualized suspicion in
addressing Fourth Amendment issues.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah

1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). The same requirement for
individualized suspicion should also be applicable to Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.
In this case, the only reason for the stop of the vehicle in which appellant
was riding was the roadblock.

There was no probable cause or articulable

suspicion to believe that appellant or the co-defendant, Shoulderblade, were
engaged in any criminal conduct prior to the stop. For this reason, the stop of
the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated Article I, Section 14 of the
Constitution of Utah.

See discussion in point LA. supra.
13

A BALANCING OF INTERESTS RESULTS IN THE
CONCLUSION THAT THE ROADBLOCK STOP IN
THIS
CASE
WAS
UNREASONABLE.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE STOP VIOLATES ARTICLE
I, SECTION 14 OF THE, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
In determining the reasonableness of police action in relation to an
interference with a privacy interest courts may apply a balancing test.

State v.

Koppel 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985). In that case the propriety of a roadblock to
investigate

drunk

driving

under

the

New

Hampshire

Constitution

was

addressed. The court required that the following test be met:
To justify the search or seizure of a motor vehicle,
absent probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion
that a criminal offense is being committed, the State
must prove that its conduct significantly advances the
public interest in a manner that outweighs the
accompanying intrusion on individual rights. It must
further prove that no less intrusive means are available
to accomplish the State's goals.
499 A.2d at 981.
In applying that test, the court held that a roadblock is not an effective
means of detecting or deterring drunk driving.

The court described the

significant number of vehicles stopped, the number of officers deployed at the
roadblock and the very few arrests that were actually made.

The court

concluded that the public interest in deterring drunk driving offenses was not
significantly outweighed by the intrusions caused by a roadblock.

This is

because the court found from the statistics introduced at trial that highly visible
roving patrols made more arrests than were effected at the roadblock.

The

patrols involved about the same number of officers as were deployed at the

14

roadblock.

Consequently, such patrols provided a less intrusive means to

accomplish the State's goals.
The Supreme Court of Idaho reached the same conclusion in State v.
Henderson, supra.

In that case the evidence indicated that officers on patrol

would make more arrests than that number of officers deployed at a roadblock.
The court concluded:
Thus, the testimony of the two police officials most
responsible for the roadblock show unequivocally that
these warrantless searches conducted without any
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing are less efficient than
the normal stops based on probable cause. Therefore,
roadblocks are an inefficient and unnecessary constraint
on a person's right to remain free of search or seizure
absent probable cause.
[emphasis in the original] 756 P.2d at 1061.
In this case, there was no evidence introduced that would demonstrate the
effectiveness of a roadblock as opposed to other less intrusive means of
investigation. However, the conclusion that can be reached from the case law is
that roadblocks are not an effective means of law enforcement. The roadblock is
not an efficient use of police manpower. Likewise, a roadblock creates a highly
intrusive and inconvenient situation for the travelling pubic.9 For these reasons,
roadblocks do not pass the balancing test employed by other state courts to
determine the reasonableness of a stop that is based neither on probable cause

9

See also, State v. Barcia, 549 A.2d 491 (N. J. Super. 1988) where a
roadblock on the New Jersey side of the George Washington bridge caused a
traffic jam in New York City involving over one million of motor vehicles, and
taking over four hours to unravel. The Court described the situation as a
"traffic morass of monumental proportions." 549 A.2d at 497.
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nor on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The State failed to produce any
evidence tending to show the effectiveness of this particular roadblock.

The

state cannot meet the requirements of the balancing test employed in Henderson
and Koppel. The only conclusion that can be reached is that the roadblock stop
in this case was unreasonable and violated Article I, Section 14 of the
Constitution of Utah.
D.
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE IS THE PROPER
REMEDY FOR A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
In State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the attorney general's
office issued investigative subpoenas in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

Citing State v. Larocco, supra, the court held that exclusion

of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of a violation of Article
I, Section 14.

This is the same conclusion that was reached by this court in

State v. Sims, supra. The roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was
a passenger violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The evidence
seized as a result of that stop is subject to suppression.
POINT II
THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF THE VEHICLE IN
WHICH APPELLANT WAS RIDING VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,

U.S.

110 S. Ct.

2481 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld the use of roadblocks, or sobriety check
points, in an effort to curtail a serious drunk driving problem.
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The roadblock

was operated pursuant to guidelines created by a state advisory committee.
That committee was comprised of both law enforcement and citizens.

The

guidelines limited the time, location and procedures for such roadblocks to meet
the problem of drunk driving. The court in Sitz then relied on a three prong
balancing test established in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) to determine if a
suspicionless stop violated the Fourth Amendment. That test requires a court to
weigh the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interests, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty.

In State v. Sims, supra, and State v.

Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1991), this court determined that two
roadblocks that were identical to the roadblock in the instant case, violated the
Fourth Amendment. Although two different judges authored the opinions. The
analysis employed in both cases was substantially the same.
In Sims, Justice Greenwood focused on the need for the roadblock to be
carried out pursuant to an established plan. The plan must include explicit
limitations on the conduct of the officers. Furthermore, it must be developed by
politically accountable officials, including people who are not involved with law
enforcement. In Sims, Justice Greenwood held that the proof of the existence of
such a plan is a prerequisite to the Brown balancing test.

The roadblock in

Sims was established and organized by the highway patrol and Juab County
Sheriffs office.

There was no explicit plan for that roadblock.

whatever plan existed was created solely by law enforcement.

Further,

Consequently,

the court held that the roadblock in Sims violated the Fourth Amendment.
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Kitchen also involved a Juab County roadblock that was substantially the
same as the roadblock in Sims. Justice Russon authored the panel decision and
held that the roadblock in Kitchen was not conducted pursuant to an explicit,
neutral plan as required by Sitz. It was also held that the roadblock failed to
pass the balancing test established in Brown. With respect to the plan the court
in Kitchen noted,
Unlike the plan in Sitz, the plan before us was
prepared by the actual officer who conducted the
roadblock, rather than by a neutral body. We question
the neutrality of any plan which is authored by the
same person whose actions the plan is purported to
limit. Secondly, the purpose of the plan in Sitz was to
provide guidelines for trie conducting of roadblocks in
general, whereas the plan before us was formed with
this specific roadblock in mind. Thirdly, unlike the
plan in Sitz, there is no evidence that the plan
provided explicit guidelines, beyond the direction to
stop only automobiles and light trucks. The guidelines
in any plan must, at a minimum, be specific enough to
prevent "arbitrary invasions" enacted "solely at the
unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Brown,
443 U.S. at 51, 99 S. Ct. at 2640. Clearly, Sergeant
Mangleson's plan did not meet this minimum
requirement.
808 P.2d at 1130.
With respect to the balancing test, the court in Kitchen first noted that
one of the reasons for the roadblock was to curtail the drunk driving problem.
This was found to satisfy the first prong of the Brown test. With respect to the
second prong of the Brown test the court stated,
However, the second prong of the Brown test,
the degree to which the roadblock advances the public
interest, has not been met. First, there was no finding
as to whether this roadblock advanced the
aforementioned public interest. Moreover, there is a
paucity of evidence, empirical or otherwise, that this
18

roadblock accomplished any of the purposes for which
it was conducted. In Sitz, in addition to data as to the
number of arrests made, records were kept as to the
number of vehicles stopped, the number subject to
further investigation, ana the length of the delay
involved. Here, only the number of violations were
recorded. Additionally, in Sitz, expert testimony was
received as to the effectiveness of roadblocks in
advancing detection of drunk drivers; here, no such
expert testimony was offered. In short, no evidence
was offered or received to support a finding that this
roadblock advanced the interests for which it was
conducted and, therefore, this prone of the Brown test
has not been met. [emphasis in the original, footnote
omitted] Id. at 1131.
The court noted that the third prong of the Brown test need not be addressed
since the roadblock had failed the second prong of the test.
The roadblock in this case is indistinguishable from those employed in
Sims and Kitchen. First, there was no explicit, neutral plan for the roadblock.
It was based on a plan established solely by law enforcement.

The plan

consisted of stopping all vehicles, requesting a driver's license and registration,
then looking for suspicious circumstances. It is obvious that the purpose of the
plan was to stop all vehicles then gather evidence that the officers would not
otherwise be entitled to receive. On this basis alone the roadblock fails to pass
the Fourth Amendment requirements as established in Sitz, Sims and Kitchen.
The roadblock in this case also fails the Brown balancing test. The stated
purpose of the roadblock was to perform safety license and registration checks
of vehicles travelling on the interstate. However, Deputy Whatcott testified that
the traffic became too heavy to conduct the safety inspections. (Tr.M.S. p. 19).
He also testified that there was no particular problem with unregistered vehicles
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or driver's license violations on the interstate. (Tr.M.S. p. 16).

Consequently,

there were little or no public concerns served by the seizures made of this
roadblock.

The second prong in Brown cannot be met by the evidence

presented in this case.

As in Kitchen, there was no evidence introduced on

what the roadblock accomplished, the number of arrests made, vehicles stopped
or the length of delay.

Likewise, there was no expert testimony introduced as

to the effectiveness of the procedure in this case. As for the final prong of the
Brown test, there was a significant degree of intrusion. Appellant, a traveller on
the

interstate, was

stopped

virtually

without

warning

and

subjected

questioning about his travel itinerary and asked specific questions
contraband.

to

about

The roadblock at issue in this case fails to meet both the Sitz and

Brown requirements for suspicionless stops. Consequently, the roadblock stop of
the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated the Fourth Amendment.
POINT III
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE
LACKED ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL
ILLEGAL STOP, MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED
INADMISSIBLE
In ruling on the suppression motion in this case, the trial court held that
the roadblock in question did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the
defendants consented to the search of the vehicle. (R. 68-71). At the time that
the suppression motion was filed and decided the rule in Utah was that a
voluntary consent purged the taint of a prior illegal stop. State v. Arroyo, 770
P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988).
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The Supreme Court of Utah reversed these rulings. The supreme court
held that for evidence to be admissible as a result of a consent to search, the
consent must be both voluntary and it must be attenuated from any prior illegal
search. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). In this case, appellant did
not raise the attenuation argument at the trial court.

However, since such a

position was not available at the time the motion was heard, this argument may
now be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Sims, supra. Furthermore,
trial counsel moved to suppress all of the "fruits" of the initial illegal search. (R.
26-29).

Under the Arroyo attenuation analysis, the consent is the fruit of the

illegal stop.
To determine if a voluntary consent is sufficiently attenuated from a prior
illegal stop or search, the courts require analysis of three factors that were
initially described in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
include:

Those factors

the temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of

consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose
and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct.

In State v. Sims, supra, the court

analyzed these factors and found as a matter of law that the consent was not
sufficiently attenuated from the initial illegal roadblock stop.

For purposes of

this attenuation analysis, the instant case and Sims are indistinguishable.
With respect to the temporal proximity, the court in Sims found that a
very short time had passed between the initial stop and the grant of consent.
The highway patrol trooper in Sims had requested and inspected the defendant's
driver's license and vehicle registration. He had questioned Sims about where
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he had been and where he was going.
presence of alcohol, firearms

The trooper then asked about the

and narcotics in the vehicle.

During

the

conversation, the trooper had observed a partially full liquor bottle on the back
seat of the vehicle.

After the conversation the trooper requested and obtained

the defendant's consent to search.
On the issue of temporal proximity, the only difference between this case
and Sims is that the deputy in the instant case observed a ziplock baggie rather
than an open liquor bottle.

The deputy in this case requested the registration

and driver's licenses of the occupants, he engaged in exactly the same
questioning as was done in Sims. Within an extremely short period of time, the
occupants of the vehicle acceded to the officer's request to search.
With respect to the question of intervening factors, the court in Sims held
that such circumstances must be independent of the intervening illegality.

The

court noted that there was nothing in the encounter that would allow the
defendant to believe that he was free to leave after the initial stop at the
roadblock.

The consent was obtained as a result of a request from the trooper.

It was not volunteered by the defendant.

The court in Sims concluded that the

consent was obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of events beginning with
the initial illegal stop.

This case also involved an unbroken chain of events

between the stop and the grant of consent. Those events, likewise included a
request from the deputy for the consent to search the vehicle.
With respect to the final factor to be considered, the court in Sims found
that one of the purposes of the roadblock, drug interdiction, was a valid
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consideration but was pursued by unauthorized means.
officers

The court held that

involved in conducting the roadblock, including Highway Patrol

Sergeant Paul Mangleson, were experienced officers who would be properly
charged with the awareness that their conduct was not authorized by law. The
court also noted that using ten to twelve local officers to staff a roadblock in a
rural county may have left other parts of that jurisdiction with delayed police
assistance in the event of need.
established in a rural county.

The roadblock in this case was likewise
Sergeant Mangleson was also one of the

organizers and instructors of the officers manning the roadblock.

Finally, the

stated purpose of the roadblock-license, registration and safety checks-appeared
to be a ruse to make observations and obtain evidence from drivers that could
not be obtained without violating the Fourth Amendment.
The roadblock stop in this case was closely related in time to the consent
to search.

The consent was the result of an unbroken chain of events that

began with the roadblock stop.

Finally, there is nothing in the purpose or

nature of the roadblock that would relieve the taint from the prior illegal stop.
Consequently, the consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the
initial illegal stop to make the evidence admissible.
The evidence seized as a result of the illegal roadblock stop of the vehicle
in which appellant was riding must be ordered suppressed.

The court below

committed error by allowing that evidence to be admitted at trial. The evidence
establishing the three offenses for which appellant was convicted was that same
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evidence which is subject to suppression. Consequently, the failure of the trial
court to order the evidence to be suppressed was prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
The roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Any consent to search the vehicle was not
sufficiently attenuated from that stop to make the evidence admissible.

The

evidence seized as a result of the search of that vehicle should be ordered
suppressed.

Since the admission of that evidence at trial was prejudicial, this

court should further order a new trial where the inadmissible evidence will not
be introduced.
DATED this

day of September, 1991.

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for Appellant

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

Case Number

STATE OF UTAH,

88-2413

Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING

LEMUEL THOMAS SMALL, and DENNIS
SHOULDERBLADE,
Defendants.
********

This matter
August,

1989

on

came before the Court on the 4th day of

defendant's

motion

to suppress.

The

parties

proffered certain testimony, a witness was called and testified,
and counsel presented their arguments to the Court.

The Court,

having taken the matter under advisement, and having diligently
considered all of the evidence before it, now enters this:
RULING
On

September

29,

1988, the Utah

Highway

Patrol,

in

conjunction with the Millard County Sheriff's Office conducted a
roadblock on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15, south of
Fillmore.

Notice

of

the

checkpoint

was duly

given

before in the local newspaper of general circulation.
setting the roadblock, the officers were briefed and
to check

for proper driver's

license and vehicle

one

week

Prior to
instructed

registration.

Appropriate signs were placed, announcing the checkpoint at some
distance in front of the block.

During the roadblock, all cars were stopped.
to the roadblock, defendants were stopped.
officer present observed

Pursuant

During the stop, the

defendant Small shove a plastic bag

between the front seats of the car.

The officer checked both

defendants' identification and determined that the car was not
registered to either defendant.
dispatch

While awaiting confirmation from

regarding registration, the officer

asked

defendants

whether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car.
The response was in the negative.
permission to search the vehicle.

The officer then requested

Consent was given.

As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer
noticed a gun under the front seat.
passenger
quantity
firearms.

compartment
of

drugs,
In

the

of

the

drug
course

Subsequent search of the

vehicle

revealed

paraphernalia,
of

the

a

money,

search

of

substantial
and

the

loaded

passenger

compartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything
about the firearms or the drugs.
negative.

Defendants responded in the

They were subsequently arrested

and were apprised of

their rights before any further attempt at questioning.
As the officer searched the passenger compartment of
the vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marijuana.
subsequently,

opened

the

trunk

and

found

more

drugs

He
and

paraphernalia.
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was
properly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).

The checkpoint was located in

a flat area and was highly visible.

By allowing officers to

check licenses and vehicle registration, advanced a legitimate
governmental purpose as required in United States v. McFaydenf
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
As

further

required

in

McFayden ,

there

was

no

discretion on the part of officers stopping the cars—all were
required to stop.

While there is some question as to whether all

of the large trucks were stopped at the roadblock, there was no
clear testimony that they were not stopped.

The court notes that

the Tenth Circuit has ruled that letting certain vehicles through
the roadblock unchecked

is not, per se, an unlawful practice.

United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987).

In any

event, it is undisputed that all passenger vehicles were stopped.
Questioning

as

part

of

an

initial

stop

does

not

normally rise to the level of a custodial interrogation.

The

Utah

not

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

Miranda

warnings

are

required for investigation and interview pursuant to determining
whether a crime has been committed.

Salt Lake City v. Carrier,

664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983).
The factors required for a Miranda warning under Carner
are not present.

Here questioning as to the contents of the car

was made as the officer awaited information from the dispatcher
relative to vehicle registration.

Questioning made during the

search of the vehicle was not accusatory.

Any interrogation if

it can be called that was brief and informal.
1171.

See Carner, at

The defendants were only detained after facts came to

light during the check that created a reasonable suspicion that
the occupants were engaged in some criminal activity (Carrier).
The uncontroverted testimony is that the defendants were properly
advised of their rights before further attempts at questioning.
All of
location,

the above factors: notice of the stop, its

legitimate

purpose

of

the

stop,

training

of

the

officers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was
an articulateble and reasonable suspicion,

establish a minimum

of public inconvenience.
Defendants

gave

permission

Consent was never withdrawn.

to

search

the

vehicle.

As such, the subsequent search of

the trunk was reasonable and proper.

Even if the consent was

somehow defective, (and there is no evidence that this is the
case) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the
passenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had
probable cause to search the trunk space.

See State v. Earl, 716

P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) .
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the
vehicle

stop,

administered.

search,

and

subsequent

arrest

were

properly

The Court therefore denies defendants1 motion to

suppress.
DATED at Provo, Utah this ^ t

n
day of August, 1989.
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